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*Questions on Chapter 2: Experiments in Behavioural Economics*  
[test bank behavioural economics and experiments-1e-chaudhuri](#)

*The material in this chapter does not lend itself easily to multiple-choice questions. Therefore, I am only providing short essay type questions for this chapter.*

1. What is the Duhem-Quine problem?
2. When some economists criticize experiments as lacking “external validity”, what is it that they are referring to? Your answer should contain at least two separate points; one regarding the nature of the stakes and the other relating to the use of student participants.
3. What is one way of creating a series of one-shot games in the lab? What is the difference between stranger matching, perfect stranger matching and fixed matching?
4. In paying participants in experiments, what is a potential drawback in paying for all rounds? What is potential drawback in paying for one randomly selected round?
5. What is the distinction between “learn while you earn” and “learn before you earn”? What are the implication of these two different payment schemes on learning to pick the optimal strategy in games that are complex and require substantial learning on the part of participants over time?
6. What is the difference between a “between subjects” treatment and a “within subjects” treatment?
7. What is an “experimenter demand effect”? What is the difference between “cognitive experimenter demand effect” and “social experimenter demand effect”?
8. What is the difference between a “single blind” and “double blind” experimental protocol? How do “double blind” protocols in the medical sciences differ from “double blind” protocols in the social sciences?