

MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. Which category of interest is usually considered the most basic, a prerequisite for other goals?
 - a. Security.
 - b. Economic welfare.
 - c. Material welfare.
 - d. Ideological.
 - e. Geographic land.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?
MSC: Understanding

2. What was the logic behind the United States' claim that the United Nations Security Council would become irrelevant if it did not endorse regime change in Iraq?
 - a. The United Nations is categorically opposed to dictatorships.
 - b. Regime change naturally follows a policy of economic sanctions.
 - c. The United States was the largest contributor to the United Nations and failure to listen to the United States was ill advised.
 - d. Failing to support regime change would be a failure to uphold its own resolutions on Iraq's weapon programs.
 - e. Iraq's continued refusal to vote on resolutions was undermining the United Nations.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?
MSC: Remembering

3. Why did the United Nations Security Council NOT endorse the preventive war against Iraq in 2003?
 - a. The members of the Security Council believed Iran was a bigger threat than Iraq, and the Council should direct its energy there instead.
 - b. The Security Council is unable to endorse military action against sovereign countries.
 - c. The United Nations General Assembly would veto any action by the Security Council.
 - d. Since the Security Council oversaw humanitarian programs in Iraq, it decided to remain neutral, rather than risk a conflict of interest.
 - e. Several permanent members of the Security Council opposed going to war against Iraq and could veto any endorsement of the war.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?
MSC: Understanding

4. A person goes to college with the hope of improving his or her earning power and future income upon graduation. This is an example of which type of goal that an actor might have?
 - a. Security.
 - b. Material welfare.
 - c. Ideological.
 - d. Power.
 - e. Geographic.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?
MSC: Applying

5. A state wanting to promote democracy in developing countries would be pursuing which kind of goal?
 - a. Power.
 - b. Security.
 - c. Ideological.
 - d. Economic gain.
 - e. Material welfare.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?
MSC: Applying

6. In international relations, actors can be any of the following EXCEPT:

- a. individuals.
- b. international organizations.
- c. groups.
- d. rules.
- e. states.

ANS: D

DIF: Easy

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Remembering

7. Which of the following is an example of a state?

- a. The United Nations.
- b. Iraq.
- c. Saddam Hussein.
- d. The Middle East.
- e. The American Republican Party.

ANS: B

DIF: Easy

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Applying

8. What is a failed state?

- a. An area of the world that never became a consolidated state.
- b. A state in which the central authority has broken down.
- c. A state that initiates a war that it then loses.
- d. A state that experiences a major debt crisis.
- e. A state that is absorbed by another state.

ANS: B

DIF: Easy

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Understanding

9. Which entity is the most prominent actor in international relations?

- a. States.
- b. People.
- c. Nongovernmental organizations.
- d. Terrorist groups.
- e. Leaders.

ANS: A

DIF: Easy

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Remembering

10. Why did warfare play such an important role in the emergence of sovereign states?

- a. Constant military struggle left voters wanting a more powerful central state.
- b. The United Nations Security Council favors sovereign states to help prevent the outbreak of war.
- c. The need for military success and protection forced smaller or less powerful states to merge.
- d. Smaller, more agile states were better able to take advantage of technological advances in warfare.
- e. Peace treaties often declared the boundaries of new states to help prevent future wars.

ANS: C

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Understanding

11. What is NOT a core element of sovereignty?

- a. The sovereign possesses ultimate authority over the people and territory of a given realm.
- b. External actors are excluded from exercising political authority over a sovereign people.
- c. The sovereign does not share his or her authority of sovereignty with other actors.
- d. Sovereign bodies must each have a military to defend themselves.
- e. All sovereign units are formally equal or have the same legal status.

ANS: D

DIF: Easy

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Understanding

12. Which of the following is NOT considered a threat to the nature of sovereignty?
- a. Supranational bodies.
 - b. Globalization.
 - c. Decolonization.
 - d. Civil conflict.
 - e. Centralization of power.

ANS: E

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Understanding

13. The following are all examples of nongovernmental organizations EXCEPT:
- a. the Red Cross.
 - b. Amnesty International.
 - c. the United Nations.
 - d. Greenpeace.
 - e. Doctors without Borders.

ANS: C

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Applying

14. Why are some interactions considered to be strategic interactions?
- a. In strategic interactions, an actor has to prepare an unconditional strategy.
 - b. In strategic interactions, different actors have different interests.
 - c. In strategic interactions, actors have a set of preferences that change, depending on what actions other actors have taken.
 - d. In strategic interactions, actors are unlikely to consider the future consequences of their choices.
 - e. In strategic interactions, each actor's plan of action depends on what the other actors are expected to do.

ANS: E

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

15. What is NOT an assumption in studying interactions?
- a. Actors can safely ignore the actions of others in pursuing their interests.
 - b. Actors are purposeful.
 - c. Actors behave with the intention of producing a desired result.
 - d. Actors are strategic.
 - e. Actors adopt strategies based on what they believe are the likely actions of others.

ANS: A

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

16. Cooperation is a type of:
- a. institution that makes agreements easier for two actors.
 - b. institution that sets the rules for interactions between actors.
 - c. interaction in which one actor will receive more and the other actor less of the desired outcome.
 - d. interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve some outcome they prefer.
 - e. interaction in which at least one party prefers the status quo.

ANS: D

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

17. Which of the following is an example of cooperation?
- A group of friends each contributing money to throw a party.
 - A single corporation lobbying Congress for trade protection from foreign imports.
 - A country cutting back on its emission of greenhouse gases.
 - Media companies dividing up the limited radio spectrum among themselves.
 - Two water districts agreeing that each should get half of a local river's water.


ANS: A

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

18. In the figure, a point on the line segment *ab* represents what in relation to *q*?



- A gain only for actor A.
- A gain only for actor B.
- A loss for both actors.
- A gain for both actors.
- No improvement for either actor.


ANS: D

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

19. What does the triangle *qba* represent?



- The set of all possible improvements for actor A.
- The set of all possible improvements for actor B.

- c. The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B.
- d. The zone in which neither actor would agree to a bargain.
- e. The zone of potential losses for both actors.


ANS: C

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

20. What does line segment qb represent?



- a. Possible improvements for actor A that do not affect the welfare of B.
- b. Possible improvements for actor B that do not affect the welfare of A.
- c. The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B.
- d. The zone in which neither actor would agree to a bargain.
- e. The zone of potential losses for both actors.


ANS: B

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

21. What is true if the status quo agreement is at point a ?



- a. Any movement within the qba triangle is positive-sum.
- b. Any movement along the line segment ab is zero-sum.
- c. There are no possible agreements between the two actors.
- d. Agreement within triangle qba is likely.

e. Actor A will improve its share by making an agreement that is closer to point *b*.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

22. Bargaining is a type of interaction:
- that involves the distribution of a fixed value.
 - in which no one loses.
 - in which success is determined by institutions.
 - in which zero-sum calculations do not apply.
 - in which new value is created.

ANS: A DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

23. Successful cooperation depends upon all of the following EXCEPT:
- the number of actors involved in an interaction.
 - how quickly the actors can interact.
 - the number of times actors interact.
 - how much the actors value the future.
 - the accuracy of the information they possess.

ANS: B DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

24. Two actors facing a coordination problem are:
- unlikely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem.
 - likely to find a mutually acceptable solution only if one actor has more power than the other.
 - likely to find an acceptable solution that is much more beneficial for one actor than for the other.
 - likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that is difficult to enforce.
 - likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that requires little enforcement.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

25. All of the following are examples of solutions to coordination problems EXCEPT:
- drivers in the United Kingdom drive on the left side of the road.
 - international airline pilots all speak English to make international communication easier.
 - peacekeepers separate two armies in a civil war to stop the conflict.
 - all firms producing compact discs use a single compatible format.
 - countries allocate international flight paths to avoid midair collisions.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

26. _____ interactions are the simplest kind of cooperation between actors.
- | | |
|----------------|------------------|
| a. Competitive | d. Positive-sum |
| b. Zero-sum | e. Collaborative |

c. Coordination

ANS: C DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

27. What kind of problem does the Prisoner's Dilemma story illustrate?

- a. Coordination.
- b. Linkage.
- c. Coercion.
- d. Collaboration.
- e. Zero-sum.

ANS: D DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

28. The most likely outcome for both participants in the Prisoner's Dilemma is:

- a. both keep quiet, so that both prisoners go free.
- b. both provide evidence against each other and go to jail.
- c. both provide evidence against each other but avoid jail due to bargaining.
- d. one prisoner keeps quiet, while the other provides evidence and avoids jail.
- e. both keep quiet and spend time in jail.

ANS: B DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

29. How was the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union analogous to the Prisoner's Dilemma?

- a. Both sides ended up with fewer weapons than they wanted but still had enough to defend themselves from the other.
- b. Each side kept quiet about the number of nuclear weapons it had, so that it could more easily defect.
- c. Both sides provided evidence of nuclear weapons and cooperated in creating an arms agreement.
- d. The United States provided evidence of nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union remained quiet and thus defected instead of cooperating.
- e. Collectively each side would have been better off if both had fewer weapons, but each side had an incentive to defect.

ANS: E DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

30. Which is the best definition of a public good?

- a. A benefit that is paid for by the government out of tax dollars collected from the general public.
- b. A product created by public agencies for the use of all citizens of a country.
- c. A product that cannot be withheld from anyone and whose use does not prohibit anyone else from enjoying it.
- d. The supplies that governments provide for infrastructure projects.
- e. A good universally demanded by the public.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

31. Which of the following is an example of a public good?
- A free lunch provided by a soup kitchen.
 - The clean air resulting from laws reducing pollution.
 - A tariff protecting an important national industry.
 - Electric cars that reduce smog for everyone.
 - Government tax credits for companies that make safer cars.

ANS: B

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

32. A state wanting to free ride with regard to ozone depletion would:
- sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases but continue to produce such ozone-depleting emissions, while other states decreased their own emissions.
 - sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases but would reduce emissions only if all other signatories also reduced their emissions.
 - refuse to sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, because it would not trust other states to reduce their own emissions.
 - sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases and then reduce its emissions only as much as the other signatories reduce their emissions.
 - freely reduce emissions without signing any entangling agreements.

ANS: A

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

33. Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?
- Countries are better able to threaten reciprocal punishment and cooperation in the future.
 - Countries that are closer together are also more likely to cooperate.
 - Countries are more likely to comply with treaties when their commitments are clearly specified.
 - Countries are more likely to cooperate when no country is more powerful than the other.
 - Multiple interactions make the threat of force less credible.

ANS: A

DIF: Difficult

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

34. How does iteration differ from linkage?
- In iteration, agreements are specifically enumerated, rather than being combined or linked to other agreements.
 - In iteration, all actors share all relevant information, rather than strategically withholding key information.
 - In iteration, an actor makes the first move in negotiations rather than waiting to use information from other sources to get a better outcome.
 - In iteration, an actor waits for others to set the agenda for bargaining, rather than promising cooperation in the future.
 - In iteration, an actor can punish another by withholding cooperation in the future, rather than withholding cooperation on other issues.

ANS: E

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

35. In 2003, why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?
- a. Saddam Hussein thought Iran might attack if the Iranians knew he did not have any weapons of mass destruction.
 - b. Saddam Hussein thought that the United States would be deterred from invading if it thought Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction.
 - c. Saddam Hussein had been lied to by Iraqi scientists and thought that Iraq really did have weapons of mass destruction.
 - d. Saddam Hussein thought that Russia would approve of an invasion if it knew Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction.
 - e. Saddam Hussein thought that inspectors from the United Nations would be able to find out for themselves that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction.

ANS: A

DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

36. All of the following statements about power are true EXCEPT:
- a. power is the ability to not have to make concessions when bargaining.
 - b. power is the ability to get another to do what that actor would not otherwise do.
 - c. power is the ability to get the other side to make concessions when bargaining.
 - d. the actor with more power always gets the outcome it prefers when bargaining with others.
 - e. the more power one has, the better the outcome one can expect from bargaining.

ANS: D

DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

37. If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide, the reversion outcome would be:
- a. the Security Council members would return for more negotiations.
 - b. the genocide would be ended.
 - c. the genocide would continue.
 - d. economic sanctions would automatically be enacted.
 - e. a 30-day cooling-off period would begin.

ANS: C

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

38. When bargaining with others, one actor will have an advantage if:
- a. there are many other actors with whom to bargain.
 - b. the actor is more satisfied with the reversion outcome than the others.
 - c. it cares more about the outcome of the bargain.
 - d. the actor needs to end the bargaining process quickly.
 - e. the actor has no other options but to come to an agreement.

ANS: B

DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

39. Imposing some cost on others to reduce the value of the reversion outcome is known as:
- a. coercion.
 - b. reversion.
 - d. enforcement.
 - e. collaboration.

c. linkage.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

40. One means with which a country can coerce other countries is:
- walking away from negotiations.
 - setting the agenda for negotiations.
 - threatening or using military force against the other countries.
 - withholding information from the other countries.
 - having an international organization mediate the dispute.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

41. An actor using agenda-setting power during bargaining:
- makes the last (and decisive) move.
 - uses knowledge of the agenda to create coalitions with other actors.
 - links items on the agenda to other issues, in order to coerce other actors.
 - acts first and therefore changes what choices are available to the other actors.
 - keeps the official record of the proceedings and uses this to promote its own description of the agreement or treaty.

ANS: D DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

42. If not resolved, all of the following can hinder cooperation EXCEPT:
- incentives to defect.
 - large numbers of actors.
 - nonrepeated interactions.
 - coalition building.
 - imperfect information.

ANS: D DIF: Easy

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

43. Why is enforcement by institutions actually "self-enforcement"?
- Institutions can force their own members to comply with their agreements without outside help.
 - There is no central international authority capable of forcing actors to cooperate.
 - To force members to cooperate, actors pay dues to their institutions to create their own enforcement agency.
 - Each institution is defined as a sovereign entity or "self."
 - Conflicts are resolved by a rotating panel of members who punish those who violate the rules.

ANS: B DIF: Easy

REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Understanding

44. Institutions facilitate cooperation by doing all of the following EXCEPT:
- forcing actors to collaborate.
 - setting standards of behavior.
 - verifying compliance.
 - reducing costs of joint decision making.
 - resolving disputes.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
MSC: Understanding

45. Which of the following is an example of an institution helping to verify compliance?
- a. The United Nations banning the use of satellites and planes to spy on other countries.
 - b. United Nations resolutions clearly banning Iraq from possessing weapons of mass destruction.
 - c. The North American Free Trade Agreement having 22 chapters of detailed rules on trade and investment between the member countries.
 - d. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors searching for nuclear weapons that would violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
 - e. The United Nations Security Council approving the use of military force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
MSC: Applying

46. What is true about national elections prior to 1962?
- a. More people turned out for elections than after 1962.
 - b. Elections were rarely or never monitored.
 - c. There were more elections held internationally.
 - d. Most elections were monitored by other states.
 - e. Some elections were monitored by other states.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
MSC: Remembering

47. Some organizations, like the World Trade Organization, have created dispute-settlement procedures that:
- a. include a policing agency that can force states to comply with any court rulings.
 - b. help resolve disputes by interpreting ambiguous rules.
 - c. write new rules when the members of the organization disagree with the old rules.
 - d. create a court with the power to subpoena and fine members who violate the rules.
 - e. have not helped resolve disputes between members.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
MSC: Applying

48. The best example of institutional bias reflecting the history of its creation is the:
- a. one country-one vote procedure in the United Nations General Assembly.
 - b. unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community before 1986.
 - c. veto power of the five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council.
 - d. qualified majority voting rule of the European Union.
 - e. consensus procedure in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
MSC: Applying

49. Why do powerful countries NOT ignore World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that hurt their own economic interests?
- a. The World Trade Organization dispute arbitration panel can effectively enforce punishment of rule violators.
 - b. The World Trade Organization can take powerful countries to court in their own country.
 - c. Powerful countries would rather follow the rules than cause harm to poorer countries.

- d. Powerful countries fear that they will have to pay fines if they violate the rules.
- e. Powerful countries benefit from the whole system of trading rules and do not want others to also violate the rules.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
 MSC: Understanding

50. Even though currently powerful countries like Germany, Brazil, and Japan would like a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, they have not started their own competing international organization but have kept their protests within the United Nations' system. This is best an example of what?
- a. Often it is cheaper and easier to use existing institutions even if they do not exactly match an actor's preferences.
 - b. Institutions with self-enforcement are more likely to last.
 - c. Institutions are created to reflect the biases of those who have the most power at that time.
 - d. Institutions lower the costs of joint decision making by providing a forum for actors to have repeated interactions.
 - e. Institutions are most effective when they serve multiple roles, such as assisting in verifying compliance and reducing costs of joint decision making.

ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?
 MSC: Applying

51. For the game below, what is A2's payoff in cell *CD*?

		A2				A2	
		C	D			C	D
A1	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.	A1	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.		D	4, 1	2, 2*

- a. 1.
- b. 2.
- c. 3.
- d. 4.
- e. Undefined.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
 MSC: Applying

52. For the game below, what is the equilibrium (or equilibria) for A1 and A2?

		A2				A2	
		C	D			C	D
A1	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.	A1	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.		D	4, 1	2, 2*

- a. C, C .
- b. C, D .
- c. D, C .
- d. D, D .
- e. C, C and D, D .

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
 MSC: Understanding

53. Below is an example of which game?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	4, 1	2, 2*

- a. Chicken.
- b. The Prisoner's Dilemma.
- c. Stag Hunt.
- d. Coordination.
- e. Cooperation.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
 MSC: Applying

54. For the game below, what is A2's payoff in cell DD ?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."
	D	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	2, 4*
	D	4, 2*	1, 1

- a. 1.
- b. 2.
- c. 3.
- d. 4.
- e. Undefined.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
 MSC: Applying

55. For the game below, what is the equilibrium (or equilibria) for A1 and A2?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."
	D	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	2, 4*
	D	4, 2*	1, 1

- a. C, C.
b. D, D.
c. C, C and D, D.
d. C, D and D, C.
e. C, C; D, D; and C, D.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
MSC: Understanding

56. Below is an example of which game?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."
	D	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	2, 4*
	D	4, 2*	1, 1

- a. Chicken.
b. The Prisoner's Dilemma.
c. Stag Hunt.
d. Coordination.
e. Cooperation.

ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory
MSC: Applying

57. For the game below, what is A2's payoff in cell CC?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both hunters split the stag.	A1 goes hungry; A2 eats the rabbit.
	D	A1 eats the rabbit; A2 goes hungry.	Both hunters split the rabbit.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	4, 4*	1, 3
	D	3, 1	2, 2*

- a. 1.
b. 2.
c. 3.
d. 4.
e. Undefined.

ANS: D
MSC: Applying

DIF: Easy

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

58. For the game below, what is the equilibrium (or equilibria) for A1 and A2?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both hunters split the stag. 4, 4*	A1 goes hungry; A2 eats the rabbit. 1, 3
	D	A1 eats the rabbit; A2 goes hungry. 3, 1	Both hunters split the rabbit. 2, 2*

- a. C, C.
- b. C, D.
- c. C, C and D, D.
- d. C, D and D, C.
- e. C, C; D, D; and C, D.

ANS: C

DIF: Moderate

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Understanding

59. Below is an example of which game?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both hunters split the stag. 4, 4*	A1 goes hungry; A2 eats the rabbit. 1, 3
	D	A1 eats the rabbit; A2 goes hungry. 3, 1	Both hunters split the rabbit. 2, 2*

- a. Chicken.
- b. The Prisoner's Dilemma.
- c. Stag Hunt.
- d. Coordination.
- e. Cooperation.

ANS: C

DIF: Difficult

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Applying

60. Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?

- a. A trade agreement in which each side wants more concessions from the other country.
- b. A nuclear crisis in which each side wants to take a tough stance.
- c. A peacekeeping mission for which countries are reluctant to send their troops.
- d. A conference in which countries negotiate over setting international standards for encoding CDs.
- e. An invasion of a small country by a large coalition of countries that did not want to attack alone.

ANS: B

DIF: Easy

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Applying

ESSAY

1. Who can be considered an actor in international relations? Which actors are the most important for an analysis of world politics and why?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

2. What do we mean when we refer to a “state” in world politics? Why must states have sovereignty? How has the notion of sovereignty changed over time?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

3. What is the difference between a national interest and an interest of a politician acting as a head of state? Give an example of each to illustrate your point.

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Applying

4. What are public goods and why are public goods often provided by governments, rather than private individuals or groups?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

5. How does bargaining differ from cooperation?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

6. How might states use coercion, outside options, and agenda-setting to exercise power when bargaining with other actors?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

7. What is the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and why is mutual defection the expected outcome of the game?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Understanding

8. Under what conditions are both hunters likely to cooperate in the Stag Hunt game?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Understanding

9. Explain how the number of actors, iteration, the importance of the future, and information contribute to successful cooperation.

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

10. Explain how access to information affects the probability of successful cooperation.

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

11. Why would it be in the interest of sovereign states to comply with institutions?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Evaluating

12. How can institutions enforce cooperation between states, given that the world is anarchic?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

13. How can institutions be used to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Understanding

14. Why did the interests and interactions of the United States and Iraq lead to the 2003 Iraq War?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

15. Why would the leader of a state want to invite outside monitors during an election?

ANS:

Answer will vary.

REF: Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Understanding